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Abstract: In this paper, we examine the redistributive efficacy of affirmative action exploring the role of 
race and socioeconomic status in admissions at the University of Brasilia, which established racial quotas 
in July 2004 reserving 20% of admissions slots for students who self-identified as black. To evaluate the 
extent to which the policy might promote racial and socioeconomic diversity in admissions, we compare 
individuals who were not admitted but would have been if the quota system had not existed with 
individuals who were admitted but would not have been if the quota system had not existed. We present 
evidence that displacing applicants are considerably more black than displaced applicants and are, by 
many measures, from families with significantly lower socioeconomic status. Using data on young men 
and women living in Distrito Federal and data on university admissions, we find that race and 
socioeconomic status are both significant determinants of college attendance. Furthermore, first-
difference regressions involving pairs of siblings suggest that skin tone may have an independent effect 
on performance on the university entrance exam. Lastly, we analyze two alternative hypothetical policies, 
quotas for students who attended public secondary school and quotas for students from low income 
households, with respect to their likely impact on racial and socioeconomic diversity.
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Resumo: Esse artigo examina a eficácia redistributiva de ações afirmativas, explorando o papel de raça e 
status socioeconômico na admissão à Universidade de Brasília (UnB), que estabeleceu cotas raciais em 
julho de 2004, reservando 20% de suas vagas para estudantes que se auto-identificarem como negros. 
Para avaliar a capacidade dessa política em promover a diversidade racial e socioeconômica nas 
admissões, comparamos indivíduos que não foram admitidos (deslocados), mas teriam sido se o sistema 
de cotas não existisse, com indivíduos que foram admitidos (deslocadores), mas não teriam sido caso o 
sistema não existisse. Apresentamos evidência de que os candidatos deslocadores são consideravelmente 
mais negros que os deslocados e que são, com base em várias medidas, de famílias com piores condições 
socioeconômicas. Usando dados de jovens que vivem no Distrito Federal e dados do processo de seleção 
para a UnB, encontramos que tanto raça quanto status socioeconômico são determinantes do acesso à 
universidade.  Além disso, estimativas em primeiras-diferenças, envolvendo pares de irmãos, indicam que 
o tom da pele parece ter um efeito independente no desempenho no vestibular. Por fim, analisamos duas 
políticas hipotéticas alternativas, cotas para alunos que frequentaram escola secundária pública e cotas 
para alunos de domicílios de baixa renda, relativamente a seus prováveis impactos na diversidade racial e 
socioeconômica. 
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1I. Introduction
About ten times more slaves arrived in Brazil than in British Mainland North America (Eltis, 
2001). As a result, Brazil has had a large black and mixed-race population. In 2007, about 49.4% of 
Brazil's population of 184 million was branco, 42.3% pardo, 7.5% preto, and 0.8% Indigenous or Asian 
(IBGE, 2009).
1 Even though the rate of ethnic intermarriage is relatively high, significant racial disparities 
in education, income, health, and other dimensions continue to exist (Telles, 2004). For this reason, a 
handful of universities have recently adopted racial quotas in admissions. However, is a race-based 
university policy an effective way to reduce such disparities? To address this question, it is necessary to 
raise another. How are race and socioeconomic status related to college attendance?
In this paper, we examine the redistributive efficacy of affirmative action exploring the role of 
race and socioeconomic status in college admissions. To this end, we study the experience of the 
University of Brasilia (UnB), which established racial quotas in July 2004 making it the first federal 
university in the country and the only university in the region to do so. At UnB, 20% of available 
admissions slots are reserved for students who self-identify as negro (black). Individuals who are selected 
for admission under the quota system are required to attend an interview with a university panel that 
verifies that they are "black enough" to qualify. In the analysis, we use university admissions records as 
well as a nationally representative survey. The admissions data include exam scores, sociodemographic 
variables, and personal information enabling us to identify pairs of siblings.
To determine the extent to which racial preferences in admissions might promote racial and 
socioeconomic diversity extending disadvantaged individuals an opportunity to attend college, we 
compare displaced and displacing applicants—those who were not admitted but would have been if the 
quota system had not existed and those who were admitted but would not have been if the quota system 
had not existed. Based on admissions data, we find that displacing applicants are considerably more black 
than   displaced   applicants   and   are,   by   many   measures,   from   families   with   significantly   lower 
socioeconomic status. We are able to verify these findings using a student survey conducted by the 
authors. The survey also reveals that, relative to displacing students, displaced students were admitted by 
higher quality alternative universities and would have had better academic outcomes at UnB.
We then estimate the determinants of educational attainment. For young men and women living in 
Distrito Federal, socioeconomic status is a better predictor of college attendance than race. However, due 
to sample size, we are unable to estimate separate effects for pardos and pretos. In contrast, both race and 
socioeconomic status are significant determinants of admission to UnB. The results indicate that pretos 
have especially lower entrance exam scores than whites. Exploiting within-family variation in skin tone, 
we identify the impact of race on entrance exam scores. First-difference and fixed effects regressions 
involving pairs of siblings imply that, holding constant household characteristics, darker-skinned 
applicants tend to have lower entrance exam scores than lighter-skinned applicants. Racial discrimination 
or stereotype threat may explain this finding. Alternative hypotheses are also discussed.
Finally, we consider two alternative hypothetical policies. The first is to reserve 50% of 
admissions slots for applicants who had attended public secondary school, and the second is to reserve 
20% of admissions slots for applicants who had monthly family income equal to or less than R$ 500 (two 
minimum salaries at the time) . We find that both alternative policies would raise racial diversity, but the 
actual policy of racial quotas does so to a greater extent. Quotas for public secondary school students 
would raise socioeconomic diversity to the same degree that racial quotas do, while quotas for low 
income   students   would   raise   it   even   more.  Therefore,   if   more   emphasis   is   placed   on   raising 
socioeconomic diversity than on raising racial diversity, quotas for low income students may be preferred. 
If more emphasis is placed on raising racial diversity, racial quotas may be preferred.
1Throughout the paper, we use various racial terms in Portuguese. The term “branco” refers to whites, typically individuals 
with light skin color, “pardo” refers to black-white mixed-race individuals, typically those with intermediate skin color, and 
“preto” refers to blacks, typically those with dark skin color. The term “negro” is indicative of black racial identity.
2This paper contributes to the economics of educational attainment, particularly as it relates to race 
and socioeconomic status. One subset of the literature examines the socioeconomic determinants of 
college attendance (Liu et al., 2006; Pallais and Turner, 2006; Stanley, 2003; Vignoles and Powdthavee, 
2009). Another subset investigates the sources of racial disparities in college attendance (Cameron and 
Heckman, 2001; Kane, 1994; Light and Strayer, 2002; Rivkin, 1995). One of the most cited papers, 
Cameron and Heckman (2001), finds that long-term parental background and family characteristics 
explain most of the racial disparities in college attendance in the US. Additionally, some studies 
demonstrate the importance of skin tone—beyond the influence of race—on schooling and labor 
(Bodenhorn, 2006; Goldsmith, Hamilton, and Darity, 2006, 2007; Hersch, 2006; Loury, 2009; Rangel, 
2007). For example, Rangel (2007) finds evidence that Brazilian parents invest less human capital in 
darker-skinned children than lighter-skinned children.
This paper also contributes to the economics of affirmative action in higher education. Most 
empirical papers about affirmative action in higher education focus on the US experience (Bowen and 
Bok, 1998). Several investigate how the elimination of affirmative action and other state-level policy 
changes might affect the enrollment of minority students in college (Card and Krueger, 2005; Conrad and 
Sharpe, 1996; Dickson, 2006; Long 2004a, 2004b). Other studies examine the academic performance of 
minorities and subsequent gains to minorities in the labor market (Arcidiacono, 2005; Loury and Garman, 
1993; Rothstein and Yoon, 2008). Some research looks at affirmative action in developing countries like 
India and Brazil. Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2008) evaluate the efficiency of a quota system at 
an engineering college in India. They find that the program successfully targeted poorer students who, in 
spite of lower entrance exam scores, enjoyed substantial gains in the labor market. However, the gains for 
marginal upper-caste students were larger than those for marginal lower-caste students. Like this paper, 
Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2008) is one of the only papers able to identify and compare 
displaced and displacing applicants.
Other studies specifically address affirmative action in Brazil (Andrade, 2004; Cardoso, 2008; 
Ferman and Assunção, 2005; Francis and Tannuri-Pianto, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). Ferman and Assunção 
(2005) employ a difference-in-difference framework to investigate whether black secondary school 
students residing in states with a university adopting racial quotas had higher or lower scores on a 
proficiency exam. They find that scores were lower, which they argue is evidence of decreased effort due 
to quotas. Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2010a) characterize the impact of UnB's policy on the racial 
composition of students at the university, examine the academic performance of quota students, and 
estimate the effect of quotas on pre-university effort and black identity. They find that racial quotas raised 
the proportion of black students at the university. Despite much lower entrance exam scores, students 
admitted under the quota system had only marginally lower academic performance in college. There was 
no evidence that the policy had reduced effort in secondary school or college admissions, and if anything, 
it raised effort. Moreover, they find that quotas increased the likelihood that applicants and students self-
identified as negro. Also, Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2010b, 2010c) study racial identity among young 
adults and the racial wage gap.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background information 
on UnB's affirmative action policy. Section III describes the data and empirical strategy. Section IV 
presents the results, and Section V concludes.
II. Background and Policy
The University of Brasilia (UnB) established racial quotas in July 2004 making it the first federal 
university in the country and the only university in the region to do so. The policy was announced on June 
6, 2003. According to its architects, some of the major objectives of the policy are to fight racial 
inequalities,   compensate   for   historical   injustices,   contribute   to   the   diversity   of   experiences   and 
perspectives on campus, and raise understanding of what it means to be black in Brazil. 20% of available 
vestibular admissions slots are reserved for students who self-identify as negro. Individuals who are 
selected for admission under the quota system are required to attend an interview with a university panel 
3that verifies that they are "black enough" to qualify. Moreover, UnB provides to those who matriculate as 
quota students an array of programs and services that reinforce and foster investments in black identity. 
For example, these include lectures and events on the value of blacks in society; an academic tutoring 
program for quota students; and a permanent space on campus for quota students to study, meet, and have 
cultural activities.
UnB is one of the best public universities in Brazil. Public universities are tuition-free and 
generally better quality than private universities. It is located in Brasilia, a city of about 3.5 million (metro 
area) and the capital of Brazil. Most undergraduates are from the state (Distrito Federal). Admission is 
highly competitive. To be considered for admission, candidates select one course of study (major 
department) to which to apply and take an institution-specific entrance exam called the vestibular. While 
an individual may select only one course of study per attempt, he or she may attempt to pass the 
vestibular any number of times. Two admission exams are offered annually, one in January and another in 
July. Non-quota and quota students are selected based on their overall score, and they must also achieve a 
certain minimum score on each of the subsections. A new cohort of undergraduate students enters every 
semester (twice a year), and the average size of each cohort is approximately 2,200. Every semester, there 
are approximately 32,000 candidates for admission.
III. Data and Empirical Strategy
Populations of Interest
There are two populations of interest. The first consists of individuals who registered for the UnB 
vestibular exam two admissions cycles before (semesters of anticipated matriculation 2-2003 and 1-2004) 
or three cycles after the implementation of the quota system (semesters of anticipated matriculation 2-
2004, 1-2005, and 2-2005). We refer to this population as "applicants." The second consists of individuals 
who were admitted through the vestibular system and matriculated two admissions cycles before (2-2003 
and 1-2004) or three cycles after the implementation of the quota system (2-2004, 1-2005, and 2-2005). 
We refer to this population as "students." We draw on three principal data sources: university records, a 
student survey conducted by the authors, and a representative survey of Brazilians.
University Records (QSC)
University admissions records, the primary data source in this paper, were provided to the authors 
by CESPE, the organization that administers every aspect of admissions and selection at UnB. Records 
encompass all individuals who registered for the vestibular exam during the five admissions cycles from 
2-2003 to 2-2005. Records include individuals who were and were not selected for admission and those 
who took the exam multiple times. There are almost 150,000 entries altogether with about 90,000 unique 
individuals. For all who took the exam, we have data on semester of anticipated matriculation, course of 
study, system of admissions (quota/non-quota), gender, place of residence, exam results including sub-
scores and overall score, and selection outcome. Using names and other personal information, we are able 
to link multiple entries corresponding to the same individual as well as identify groups of siblings. 
Exploiting phenotypic variation within families, we use siblings to distinguish the effect of race from the 
effect of family socioeconomic status.
Admissions records also include an optional 18-question survey, which applicants submitted upon 
registration  for the vestibular  (thus, prior to taking the  exam).  This  survey,  the Socio-Cultural 
Questionnaire (to which we refer by its Portuguese acronym QSC), asks about marital status, family 
income, family housing, parents' education, labor market participation, public/private secondary school, 
place of residence, and several questions regarding preparation for the vestibular. It was not until 2004, 
one semester before the implementation of quotas, that questions about race were added to the QSC. The 
item "what is your race/color?" has answer choices: branco, pardo, preto, Asian, Indigenous, and "no 
answer." Another item asks "do you consider yourself black (negro)?"
4We also had access to university academic records. These data were provided by DAA (Division 
of Academic Affairs), the organization that manages course registration, graduation, and student 
transcripts at UnB. Academic data include grades and number of credits by semester of study for all 
students who had matriculated during the five semesters from 2-2003 to 2-2005. Grades range from zero 
to five, where five is the best grade possible, and zero is the worst. With this information, we are able to 
calculate overall GPA, attrition rates, and other statistics.
PSEU
The University Education Survey (to which we refer by its Portuguese acronym PSEU) is a 
student survey conducted by the authors. We conducted two types of interviews: face to face with an 
interviewer and online. Data collection is described in Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2010a). The total 
number of observations is 2,846. We were also able to obtain 960 photos of respondents who participated 
in the face to face interviews. The full version of the PSEU questionnaire entailed approximately 200 
questions   and   covered   topics   including   demography/family  background,   pre-university  education, 
university admissions, university education, employment, future/expectations, and race.
We were especially careful regarding how and when we asked about race and affirmative action, 
since we wanted to avoid raising awareness of these concepts before it was necessary and wanted to 
obscure the true purposes of the survey. For example, the title of the survey was intentionally general, and 
we never mentioned race or affirmative action in any of our contacts with potential respondents. We only 
asked respondents about race in the final section of the face to face interview and asked about their 
opinion of affirmative action on a separate, self-administered form at the conclusion of the interview.
PNAD
The PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílio) is a nationally representative cross-
sectional survey of Brazilians conducted annually by the national statistical agency, IBGE (PNAD, 2004). 
It entails a number of questions on income, employment, education, health, and other areas. So that we 
may examine the impact of race and socioeconomic status on the likelihood of college attendance in the 
general population, we construct variables comparable to those in the QSC and PSEU and restrict our 
analysis to 18-24 year olds living with their mothers in Distrito Federal in 2004.
Empirical Strategy
First, we evaluate the redistributive efficacy of UnB's racial quota policy by comparing displaced 
and displacing applicants–those who were affected by the policy at the margin (Table 1). Following the 
implementation of quotas, from 2-2004 to 2-2005, the displaced are those applicants who were not 
admitted but would have been if the quota system had not existed, while the displacing are those who 
were admitted but would not have been if the quota system had not existed. Identifying the two groups 
involves certain assumptions. We assume that the counterfactual removal of the quota system would have 
not affected who applied or performance on the vestibular. We assume that the number of applicants 
admitted (by semester and course of study) would have remained identical. In this way, 352 displaced and 
352 displacing applicants were identified. Bertrand et al. (2008) make the same assumptions but, unlike 
this paper, must make an additional assumption about enrollment rates and cannot precisely determine 
course-specific minimum admissions scores.
We also compare displaced and displacing students (Tables 2 and 3). The displaced are those 
students who were admitted prior to 2-2004 but would not have been if the quota system had existed, and 
the displacing are those who were admitted after 2-2004 but would not have been if the quota system had 
not existed. Thus, the displacing students are participants in the PSEU who were identified as displacing 
applicants as described above. It is more challenging to identify the displaced, since prior to 2-2004 we do 
not know exactly who would have applied using the quota system if it had existed, and there were no 
QSC race questions in 2-2003. For this reason, we assume that displaced students are non-black PSEU 
5participants with the lowest 10.5% of vestibular scores in each course of study. In 2-2004, displaced non-
black applicants accounted for 10.5% of non-black applicants admitted if there were no quotas.
As a purely counterfactual exercise, we compare displaced and displacing applicants under 
alternative quota policies (Table 8). The displaced are those applicants who would have been admitted 
only if the alternative quota policy did not exist, while the displacing are those who would have been 
admitted only if the quota policy did exist. To identify the two groups, we rely on the same assumptions 
underlying Table 1. We consider two alternative policies. The first is to reserve 50% of admissions slots 
for applicants who had attended public secondary school. 628 displaced and 628 displacing applicants 
were identified under quotas for public school. The second policy is to reserve 20% of admissions slots 
for applicants who had family income equal to or less than R$ 500 (two monthly minimum salaries). 
According to the PNAD, roughly 20% of young adults in Distrito Federal were living in households with 
income of R$ 500 or less. 482 displaced and 482 displacing applicants were identified under quotas for 
low income.
Furthermore, we employ regression techniques to examine the effects of race and socioeconomic 
status on educational attainment as well as college admission. We regress the outcome variable on the 
respondent's race, gender, and a number of household-level socioeconomic indicators (Tables 5 and 6). 
Controls for semester and subject area are included in regressions involving UnB applicants. Thus, for 
individual i living in household h,  yih=rihzh xihih , where    is the effect of race,  rih  is 
the race indicator,    are the effects of socioeconomic status,  zh  is the vector of socioeconomic 
indicators, and  xih  represents other individual characteristics. Additionally, using pairs of siblings in 
the QSC data, we implement a first-difference estimator (Table 7). We estimate the following regression 
for siblings  i  and  j  living in household  h:   yih− y jh=rih−r jhxih−x jhih− jh . This 
specification differences out observed and unobserved household-specific variables and exploits within-
family variation in race to estimate the effect of race on the dependent variable. For comparison, we also 
implement a sibling fixed effects estimator. Analogously, Rangel (2007) examines how within-family 
heterogeneity in skin color among siblings may impact investments in education.
IV. Results and Discussion
The Displaced and the Displacing under Racial Quotas
In this subsection, we closely examine those who are affected by racial quotas at the margin in 
order to determine the extent to which racial preferences in college admissions might promote racial and 
socioeconomic diversity. Like many affirmative action policies in higher education, UnB's policy is not 
only   intended   to   compensate   for   historical   injustices   but   also   to   reduce   inequalities   extending 
disadvantaged individuals an opportunity to attend college. Table 1 compares displaced and displacing 
applicants. As explained above, the displaced are applicants who were not admitted but would have been 
if the quota system had not existed, and the displacing are applicants who were admitted but would not 
have been if the quota system had not existed. To summarize, the table illustrates that displacing 
applicants are considerably more black than displaced applicants and are, by many measures, from 
families with significantly lower socioeconomic status. About 71% and 27% of the displacing are pardo 
and preto, respectively, while about 31% and 2% of the displaced are. 95% of the displacing are negros 
compared to 16% of the displaced. The family residence of displacing applicants is more likely to lie in 
Distrito Federal but outside of Brasilia, while that of displaced applicants is more likely to lie in Brasilia 
or outside of Distrito Federal altogether. This is indirect evidence that the displacing are more 
disadvantaged than the displaced, since the average household income of families living in Brasilia is 
multiple times higher than the average income of families living in Distrito Federal outside of Brasilia 
(PNAD, 2004). Furthermore, the QSC asks applicants directly about family income and parental 
education. 39.5% of displacing and 19.1% of displaced applicants had family income equal to or less than 
R$ 1,500, while 8.6% of displacing and 30.3% of displaced applicants had family income greater than R$ 
65,000. Differences in parental education paint a similar picture. 25.9% of displacing and 9.8% of 
displaced applicants had a mother with primary school education, whereas 34.6% of displacing and 58% 
of displaced applicants had a mother with college education. In addition, displacing applicants are 
significantly more likely to have attended public secondary school.
Table 2 compares displaced and displacing students at UnB. The displaced are those students who 
were admitted prior to 2-2004 but would not have been if the quota system had existed, and the displacing 
are those who were admitted after 2-2004 but would not have been if the quota system had not existed. In 
short, although the sample size is smaller, this table confirms the previous one that the displacing are both 
more black and more disadvantaged than the displaced. Approximately 61% and 36% of displacing 
students are pardo and preto, respectively, while about 43% and 0% of displaced students are. 69% of the 
displacing are negros compared to 1% of the displaced. That the percentage of displacing students who 
self-identified as  negro  was less than 100% is notable given that the quota system was specifically 
intended for negros. The distributions of place of family residence and family income are comparable to 
those in Table 1. As before, the displacing are significantly more likely to live in Distrito Federal outside 
of Brasilia indicating that they are from poorer households. The sample size for family income is lower 
than the sample size for the other variables because not all PSEU participants completed the QSC. This 
may account for why there are fewer significant differences between displaced and displacing students. 
Nevertheless, a significantly larger proportion of displaced students had a family income greater than R$ 
5,000. The table also shows that differences in parental education, a variable derived from the PSEU, do 
exist. For example, 36% of displacing students had a father with some college or college education 
compared to about 64% of displaced students. Mirroring the finding in Table 1, displacing students are 
significantly more likely to have attended public secondary school. Furthermore, the PSEU entails a 
number of measures of socioeconomic status that are not available in the QSC. For some of the measures, 
e.g. family has a computer, freezer, or washing machine, there are no significant differences. However, 
other measures suggest that displacing students have lower socioeconomic status than displaced students. 
In particular, 82% of the displacing live in a family with a car, while nearly 98% of the displaced do. 55% 
of displacing students live in a family without a domestic worker compared to only 31% of displaced 
students.
Table 3 compares displaced and displacing students in terms of admissions alternatives, academic 
performance in college, and attitude towards different types of quota policies. These measures may shed 
light on how marginal students would fare if they were or were not admitted by UnB. The PSEU asked 
respondents to name the alternative universities to which they applied and to say whether they were 
admitted. 31% of displacing and 42% of displaced students were admitted by an alternative university, 
although the difference is not significant. Of those who were admitted by an alternative university, 
displaced students were admitted by higher quality institutions than displacing students. To make this 
comparison, we used a standard rating of university quality published by the Brazilian Department of 
Education (INEP, 2009). In fact, 66% of displaced students were admitted by an institution with a quality 
rating above the median quality rating of alternative universities among all PSEU participants, while only 
39% of displacing students were admitted by an institution above median quality. We may also compare 
the effort and academic performance of marginal students at UnB. There is no significant difference in 
reported study effort between displaced and displacing students. This is consistent with regression results 
in Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2010a) that quota students did not exhibit lower academic effort at UnB. 
Nevertheless, displacing students are significantly less likely to have a GPA in the top 10% or top 50% 
(median) in their course of study, which may be partly explained by the fact that they had lower scores on 
the vestibular. This is consistent with evidence in Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2010a) that quota students 
had somewhat lower academic performance than non-quota students even conditional on entrance exam 
score. Not surprisingly, displacing students were considerably more likely than displaced students to 
support the policy of racial quotas in higher education. Indeed, 57% of the displacing was supportive 
compared to 22% of the displaced. Support is much higher for quotas based on public school attendance 
or family income, and there are no significant differences between displaced and displacing students.
7The Role of Race and Socioeconomic Status
In this subsection, we estimate the effects of race and socioeconomic status on educational 
attainment. Table 4 compares young adults who were college students with those who were not college 
students (and had never previously enrolled in college). According to the PNAD, about 31% of 18-24 
year olds living with their mothers in Distrito Federal were attending a public or private university. Young 
adults attending college are significantly less likely to be brown, black, or indigenous and have 
significantly higher socioeconomic status. Roughly 43% of college students and 64% of non-college 
students are brown, black, or indigenous. Only 3.5% of college students come from families with income 
less than R$ 750 compared to more than 23% of non-college students. Half of all college students have 
family income greater than R$ 5,000, while only 8% of non-college young adults have. Differences in 
other socioeconomic indicators are substantial. 73% of college students have access to the internet at 
home versus 16% of non-college students. Less than 2% of college students lived in a household that 
went without food recently compared to almost 23% of non-college students. In Table 5, we regress 
educational attainment on race, gender, and household-level socioeconomic indicators. The relatively low 
sample size precludes us from breaking race into detailed subcategories. As column 3 indicates, the 
marginal effect of race on the likelihood of college attendance is not significantly different from zero 
holding constant a number of socioeconomic measures. Having high family income and having access to 
the internet at home considerably raise the likelihood of college attendance. Column 6 indicates that race 
might influence the likelihood that a young adult completes secondary school, since the coefficient on 
non-white is negative and significant at the 10% level. However, the coefficients on several of the 
socioeconomic variables are significant and larger in magnitude. Therefore, regressions involving young 
men and women living in Distrito Federal imply that socioeconomic status may play a more important 
role than race in determining educational attainment.
Table 6 examines the determinants of admission to UnB in particular. Admission solely depends 
on performance on the vestibular exam, so we estimate the effects of race and socioeconomic status on 
overall vestibular score and subscores (language, social science, and science). All regressions include 
controls for semester and subject area. Interestingly, without holding socioeconomic status constant, 
pardos have lower vestibular scores than whites, but holding it constant, they have somewhat higher 
scores. Pardos also have significantly higher social science and science subscores controlling for gender, 
family income, mother's education, and other factors. In contrast, pretos have significantly lower scores 
than whites across the board. The gap in subscores is especially large for language and science. This 
pattern may explain the results in the previous table. If the effects of being pardo and preto have opposite 
signs, then it might appear that race does not matter when  pardo  and  preto  respondents are pooled 
together. Moreover, applicants who were unwilling to choose one of the standard race categories had 
significantly higher scores on the vestibular. To clarify, these individuals did not omit the race item; they 
selected the response "without declaration." The PSEU reveals that about half of respondents with no 
answer to the QSC race question are white and about half are pardo. Gender plays a key role as well. The 
coefficient on female is negative and significant in every regression. After controlling for socioeconomic 
status, the marginal effect of being female on vestibular score is larger in magnitude than that of being 
preto. Beyond race and gender, socioeconomic status appears to have a significant impact on vestibular 
performance. Having family income less than R$ 500 is associated with about 22 points less on the 
vestibular. Having a mother with incomplete primary schooling is associated with 11 fewer points on the 
exam, while having attended a public secondary school contributes 6 fewer points. Thus, in summary, the 
evidence indicates that both race (especially preto) and socioeconomic status are significant determinants 
of admission to UnB.
Nevertheless, unobserved household characteristics might make it difficult to distinguish the 
causal effects of race and socioeconomic status on college admission. For this reason, we take advantage 
of the fact that the admissions data include a number of pairs of siblings. Using within-family variation, 
we identify the relationship between race and vestibular performance. First of all, substantial intra-family 
8phenotypic heterogeneity exists. According to the QSC, about 23% of pairs of siblings were racially 
discordant, i.e. one sibling was black and the other was not. According to the PSEU, which minimizes the 
incentive to misrepresent one's race, about 16% of pairs of siblings were discordant. To estimate the 
effect, we employ a sibling first-difference estimator. The sample is restricted to pairs of siblings who 
both applied after the implementation of quotas in order to homogenize the institutional environment that 
they were facing. 483 sibling pairs remain. We also include controls for quota status so that we avoid 
picking up the influence of those applicants who "became black" just to apply under the quota system. 
Table 7 displays the regressions.
The evidence suggests that black racial identity and gender have a significant impact on college 
admission. In the first-difference regressions, having black racial identity is associated with lower scores 
on the vestibular as well as on the social science and science subsections. Female applicants have 
significantly lower scores on the vestibular and on all three subsections. These findings are consistent 
with several explanations. Darker-skinned applicants may have encountered racial discrimination at 
various points in their life and, as a consequence, have lower (endogenous) ability. In support of this 
notion, Rangel (2007) finds that Brazilian parents tend to invest less human capital in darker-skinned 
children than lighter-skinned children. Another causal explanation is stereotype threat. Even if black 
applicants have the same distribution of ability as non-black applicants, they simply may not perform as 
well on the exam because the salience of race itself undermines their confidence or effort. However, there 
are alternative hypotheses. It is possible that, ceteris paribus, those individuals who tend to perform 
poorly on exams may be more likely to consider themselves black. It is also possible that some applicants 
might not apply under the quota system but self-identify as black because they expect to use quotas the 
next time they apply. But while the phenomenon of racial misrepresentation may exist, the presence of 
racially discordant siblings in the PSEU, as reported above, confirms that there is at least some degree of 
real heterogeneity in skin tone and/or racial identity within families.
Alternative Quota Policies
In the final subsection, we evaluate two alternative hypothetical quota policies with respect to the 
extent to which they might promote racial and socioeconomic diversity in a manner consistent with the 
objectives of UnB's current affirmative action policy. The first alternative policy is to reserve 50% of 
admissions slots for applicants who had attended public secondary school. It is widely believed that 
students who attend public secondary school tend to be more black and more disadvantaged than those 
who attend private school, so perhaps quotas for public school students would achieve the same ends as 
quotas for blacks. The second policy is to reserve 20% of admissions slots for applicants who had family 
income equal to or less than R$ 500. According to the PNAD, roughly 20% of young adults in Distrito 
Federal were living in households with income of R$ 500 or less. Since low income households tend to be 
more black, perhaps quotas for students from low income households would achieve the same ends as 
quotas for blacks. 
Table 8 compares displaced and displacing applicants under the policies. The displaced are those 
applicants who would have been admitted only if the alternative policy did not exist, while the displacing 
are those who would have been admitted only if the policy existed. For public school quotas, 36.4% of the 
displaced and 43.8% of the displacing are pardo; 3.7% of the displaced and 10.3% of the displacing are 
preto; and 23.6% of the displaced and 38.4% of the displacing are negro. For low income quotas, 39.5% 
of the displaced and 44.4% of the displacing are pardo; 6.0% of the displaced and 16.9% of the displacing 
are preto; and 29.8% of the displaced and 48.6% of the displacing are negro. Thus, both alternative 
policies may increase racial diversity, especially in the proportion of students who are negro, but racial 
quotas appear to do so to a much greater extent. Quotas for public secondary school students would raise 
the socioeconomic diversity of the university in a way comparable to racial quotas. For example, 9.7% of 
displaced and 35.4% of displacing applicants have family income less than R$ 1,500. About 3.5% of 
displaced and 26.8% of displacing applicants have a mother with primary schooling or less. Relative to 
quotas for blacks and public school students, quotas for low income students would substantially raise 
9socioeconomic diversity. For example, 46.9% of the displaced and 74.3% of the displacing have a family 
residence in Distrito Federal outside of Brasilia. 12.1% of the displaced and 61.6% of the displacing have 
a mother with primary schooling or less. 38.5% and 76.6%, respectively, have attended public secondary 
school. Hence, if more importance is placed on raising socioeconomic diversity than on raising racial 
diversity, then quotas for low income students may be the preferred policy. If more importance is placed 
on raising racial diversity, then racial quotas may be preferred. Nevertheless, other considerations are 
relevant. As Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2010a) demonstrate, racial quotas might induce significant 
changes in racial identity, particularly among pardos. Quotas for public school students might also have 
unintended consequences, e.g. some students who would have attended private school may instead decide 
to attend public school. Likewise, quotas for low income students might be challenging to implement 
given the large proportion of poorer households that participate in the informal economy.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the redistributive efficacy of affirmative action exploring the role of race 
and socioeconomic status in admissions at the University of Brasilia. Focusing on those individuals who 
were affected by racial quotas at the margin, we evaluated the extent to which the policy may have 
promoted racial and socioeconomic diversity. We presented evidence that displacing applicants were 
considerably more black than displaced applicants and were, by many measures, from families with 
significantly lower socioeconomic status. Moreover, displaced students were admitted by higher quality 
alternative universities than displacing students. While there was no significant difference in study effort 
between displaced and displacing students, the former enjoyed better academic outcomes at UnB than the 
latter. Furthermore, we examined the determinants of college attendance. Using data on young men and 
women living in Distrito Federal, we found that socioeconomic status might play a more prominent part 
than race in influencing educational attainment. However, using data on applicants, we found that race 
and socioeconomic status are both significant determinants of admission to UnB. Indeed, first-difference 
regressions involving pairs of siblings also indicated that black racial identity has a distinct impact on 
vestibular performance. Finally, we considered two alternative hypothetical policies. Both alternative 
policies would raise racial diversity, but racial quotas have done so to an even larger extent. Quotas for 
public secondary school students would raise socioeconomic diversity to the same degree racial quotas 
have, while quotas for low income students would raise it even more. Future work may be able to 
investigate the long-term impact of racial quotas on socioeconomic inequality as well as identify the 
causal mechanism by which race affects the likelihood of college attendance.
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12Table 1
Comparing Displaced and Displacing Applicants under UnB's Racial Quota Policy
Displaced Displacing Difference in Means
Race/color
   White (branco) 44.40% 0.30% **
   Brown (pardo) 30.9 70.7 **
   Black (preto) 1.9 27 **
   Asian (amarelo) 3.1 0.7 *
   Indigenous 0.6 0.7
   No answer 19.1 0.7 **
Black racial identity (negro) 15.6 94.7 **
Female gender 40.6 44.6
Family residence
   Brasilia 52 32.1 **
   Distrito Federal, not Brasilia 34.1 59.7 **
   Outside of Distrito Federal 13.9 8.2 **
Family income
   Less than R$ 500 3.7 9.2 **
   R$ 500-1,500 15.4 30.3 **
   R$ 1,500-2,500 10.5 18.1 **
   R$ 2,500-5,000 27.2 24.7
   More than R$ 5,000 30.3 8.6 **
   Don't know 13 9.2
Father's education
   Primary school incomplete 9.3 17.1 **
   Primary school complete 5 10.5 *
   Secondary school complete 30.4 32.9
   College 52.2 35.2 **
   Don't know 3.1 4.3
Mother's education
   Primary school incomplete 4.9 16.7 **
   Primary school complete 4.9 9.2
   Secondary school complete 30.3 38.6 *
   College 58 34.6 **
   Don't know 1.9 1
Public secondary school attendance 38.9 53.3 **
NOTE. A double asterisk indicates significant difference in proportions at the 5% level, and a single asterisk indicates 
significance at the 10% level. From 2-2004 to 2-2005, the displaced are those applicants who were not admitted but would 
have been if the quota system had not existed, while the displacing are those who were admitted but would not have been if the 
quota system had not existed. 352 displaced and 352 displacing applicants were identified; the total sample size in the table is 
about 466 due to missing socioeconomic data. Data source: QSC.
13Table 2
Comparing Displaced and Displacing Students under UnB's Racial Quota Policy
Displaced Displacing Difference in Means
Race/color
   White (branco) 53.20% 2.60% **
   Brown (pardo) 43 60.5 **
   Black (preto) 0 36 **
   Asian 0 0
   Indigenous 3.8 0.9
Black racial identity (negro) 1.2 68.7 **
Female gender 45.7 50.4
Family residence
   Brasilia 51.9 35.9 **
   Distrito Federal, not Brasilia 33.3 62.4 **
   Outside of Distrito Federal 14.8 1.7 **
Family income
   Less than R$ 500 3.2 9.7
   R$ 500-1,500 19.4 30.1
   R$ 1,500-2,500 8.1 9.7
   R$ 2,500-5,000 27.4 29.1
   More than R$ 5,000 32.3 12.6 **
   Don't know 9.7 8.7
Raised with both parents 81.3 73.5
Father's education
   Less than seventh grade 11.3 17.5
   Secondary school incomplete 7.5 7.9
   Secondary school complete 8.8 28.1 **
   Some college 12.5 4.4 *
   College 51.3 31.6 **
   Masters or doctorate 8.8 10.5
Mother's education
   Less than seventh grade 5 12.9 *
   Secondary school incomplete 11.3 12.9
   Secondary school complete 20 21.6
   Some college 10 10.3
   College 46.3 35.3
   Masters or doctorate 7.5 6.9
Public secondary school attendance 31.3 52.6 **
Family has computer 96.2 90.5
Family has internet 94.9 86.2 *
Family has car 97.5 81.9 **
Family has refrigerator w/ freezer 69.7 69.6
Family has washing machine 94.9 92.3
No domestic workers at home 31.3 54.7 **
NOTE. A double asterisk indicates significant difference in proportions at the 5% level, and a single asterisk indicates 
significance at the 10% level. The displaced are those students who were admitted prior to 2-2004 but would not have been if 
the quota system had existed, and the displacing are those who were admitted after 2-2004 but would not have been if the 
quota system had not existed. The total sample size in the table is about 198. Data source: PSEU.
14Table 3
Comparing Displaced and Displacing Students under UnB's Racial Quota Policy
Displaced Displacing Difference in Means
Admissions
   Admitted by alternative university 42.00% 30.80%
   Quality rating of best alternative 286 258 *
   Best alternative above median quality 65.60% 38.90% **
Academic performance at UnB
   Average daily study hours 3.6 3.5
   Low study effort 40.00% 38.90%
   High study effort 45 46
   GPA top 10% 4.7 1 **
   GPA above median 45.8 26.4 **
   GPA bottom 10% 15 20.6
Attitude toward types of quota policies
   Support for racial quotas 22.1 57 **
   Support for public school quotas 71.4 76.3
   Support for low income quotas 64.1 66.7
NOTE. A double asterisk indicates significant difference in means at the 5% level, and a single asterisk indicates significance 
at the 10% level. The displaced are those students who were admitted prior to 2-2004 but would not have been if the quota 
system had existed, and the displacing are those who were admitted after 2-2004 but would not have been if the quota system 
had not existed. The total sample size in the table is about 198. Data source: PSEU, QSC (GPA).
15Table 4
Comparing College and Non-College Young Adults in Distrito Federal
College Non-college Difference in Means
(by Education)
Brown/black/indigenous 43.40% 64.00% **
Female gender 52.5 47.9
Low family income (<= R$ 750) 3.5 23.5 **
High family income (> R$ 5000) 50.4 8 **
Family has computer 79.7 24.8 **
Family has internet 73.1 16.1 **
Family has washing machine 87.4 50.8 **
Family has refrigerator w/ freezer 63.3 25.2 **
Family went without food recently 1.8 22.5 **
NOTE. A double asterisk indicates significant difference in proportions at the 5% level, and a single asterisk indicates 
significance at the 10% level. Sample is restricted to respondents aged 18-28 living with their mothers in Distrito Federal in 
2004. "College" refers to respondents who were students in college, and "non-college" refers to respondents who were not 
students and had never previously enrolled in college. The sample size of college is 286 and that of non-college is 626. Data 
source: PNAD.
16Table 5
Racial and Socioeconomic Determinants of Educational Attainment in Distrito Federal
Dependent Variable
College Secondary School or More
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-white (brown/black/indigenous) -0.180 -0.022 -0.040 -0.132 -0.028 -0.065
(0.031) ** (0.026) (0.034) (0.028) ** (0.026) (0.035) *
Female gender 0.032 0.038 0.039 0.148 0.150 0.150
(0.030) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) ** (0.026) ** (0.026) **
Low family income (<= R$ 750) -0.020 -0.035 -0.114 -0.189
(0.029) (0.051) (0.048) ** (0.075) **
High family income (> R$ 5000) 0.265 0.237 0.068 0.028
(0.042) ** (0.052) ** (0.026) ** (0.031)
Family has computer 0.069 0.064 0.243 0.238
(0.050) (0.050) (0.042) ** (0.043) **
Family has internet 0.293 0.296 -0.016 -0.016
(0.058) ** (0.058) ** (0.037) (0.038)
Family has washing machine 0.061 0.061 -0.009 -0.008
(0.027) ** (0.027) ** (0.034) (0.034)
Family has refrigerator w/ freezer 0.086 0.086 0.040 0.040
(0.031) ** (0.031) ** (0.028) (0.029)
Family went without food recently -0.075 -0.074 -0.210 -0.212
(0.026) ** (0.025) ** (0.051) ** (0.051) **
Low income x non-white 0.022 0.111
(0.057) (0.088)
High income x non-white 0.067 0.088
(0.066) (0.045) *
N 912 912 902 902 902 902
NOTE. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. A double asterisk indicates significance at the 5% level, and a single 
asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level. Sample is restricted to respondents aged 18-28 living with their mothers in 
Distrito Federal in 2004. "College" refers to respondents who were students in college, and "secondary school or more" refers 
to respondents who had at least completed secondary school. Data source: PNAD.
17Table 6
Racial and Socioeconomic Determinants of Admission to UnB
Vestibular Score Vestibular Subscores
Language Social Science Science
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Race/color
   Brown (pardo) -5.07 3.23 3.91 -0.330 -0.136 0.306 0.408 0.351 0.318
(1.53) ** (1.54) ** (1.67) ** (0.146) ** (0.160) (0.143) ** (0.157) ** (0.138) ** (0.149) **
   Black (preto) -28.36 -14.28 -12.15 -1.369 -1.132 -0.848 -0.643 -1.244 -1.164
(2.22) ** (2.24) ** (2.45) ** (0.232) ** (0.256) ** (0.220) ** (0.238) ** (0.197) ** (0.217) **
   Asian (amarelo) -9.97 -0.83 -0.28 -0.631 -0.567 -0.850 -0.788 0.688 0.696
(3.54) ** (3.51) (3.72) (0.336) * (0.357) (0.323) ** (0.342) ** (0.319) ** (0.337) **
   Indigenous -6.37 -4.19 -4.70 -0.814 -0.914 -0.043 0.068 -0.438 -0.530
(7.54) (7.42) (8.18) (0.717) (0.787) (0.655) (0.734) (0.674) (0.733)
   No answer 14.79 17.99 17.21 0.692 0.854 1.579 1.563 1.222 1.094
(2.35) ** (2.32) ** (2.53) ** (0.226) ** (0.252) ** (0.214) ** (0.237) ** (0.210) ** (0.230) **
Female gender -19.36 -18.69 -18.76 -0.417 -0.380 -0.685 -0.739 -2.045 -2.039
(1.43) ** (1.42) ** (1.51) ** (0.135) ** (0.144) ** (0.133) ** (0.141) ** (0.127) ** (0.134) **
Family residence
   DF, not Brasilia -16.10 -14.50 -1.842 -1.647 -0.787 -0.627 -1.372 -1.288
(1.61) ** (1.73) ** (0.153) ** (0.165) ** (0.151) ** (0.163) ** (0.144) ** (0.155) **
   Outside of DF -9.32 -6.37 -2.566 -2.327 -0.752 -0.499 -0.408 -0.214
(2.20) ** (2.33) ** (0.191) ** (0.204) ** (0.196) ** (0.209) ** (0.199) ** (0.212)
Family income
   < R$ 500 -22.83 -22.24 -1.464 -1.650 -1.950 -1.816 -1.559 -1.550
(2.73) ** (2.99) ** (0.305) ** (0.342) ** (0.279) ** (0.307) ** (0.236) ** (0.259) **
   R$ 500-1,500 -16.88 -17.33 -0.735 -0.846 -1.323 -1.346 -1.389 -1.413
(2.00) ** (2.06) ** (0.201) ** (0.207) ** (0.191) ** (0.197) ** (0.177) ** (0.182) **
   R$ 1,500-2,500 -9.20 -9.92 -0.676 -0.738 -0.658 -0.724 -0.797 -0.836
(2.03) ** (2.05) ** (0.196) ** (0.198) ** (0.190) ** (0.192) ** (0.181) ** (0.183) **
   > R$ 5,000 16.56 18.82 2.038 2.368 1.150 1.320 1.119 1.243
(2.14) ** (2.33) ** (0.184) ** (0.198) ** (0.192) ** (0.209) ** (0.195) ** (0.211) **
   Don't know -0.47 0.00 0.681 0.000 -0.631 0.000 0.189 0.000
(2.51) (0.00) (0.226) ** (0.000) (0.227) ** (0.000) (0.225) (0.000)
Mother's education
   Primary sch incomp -10.49 -10.70 -0.394 -0.325 -0.320 -0.364 -1.217 -1.234
(2.01) ** (2.08) ** (0.234) * (0.241) (0.205) (0.213) * (0.173) ** (0.179) **
   Primary sch comp -7.93 -7.91 -0.373 -0.211 -0.357 -0.393 -0.882 -0.892
(2.43) ** (2.51) ** (0.264) (0.274) (0.243) (0.254) (0.211) ** (0.217) **
   College 12.60 12.45 1.254 1.211 0.805 0.767 0.968 0.976
(1.60) ** (1.71) ** (0.149) ** (0.160) ** (0.147) ** (0.157) ** (0.144) ** (0.154) **
   Don't know 3.22 3.80 1.140 0.768 0.100 0.439 0.282 0.156
(6.35) (8.63) (0.581) * (0.816) (0.601) (0.867) (0.549) (0.713)
Public secondary sch -6.94 -6.41 -0.191 -0.202 -0.161 -0.087 -0.957 -0.940
(1.60) ** (1.69) ** (0.159) (0.169) (0.152) (0.162) (0.143) ** (0.151) **
Low income x negro -3.97 -0.001 -0.580 -0.083
(2.79) (0.326) (0.291) ** (0.238)
High income x negro -8.13 -1.154 -0.610 -0.455
(4.19) * (0.367) ** (0.369) * (0.399)
N 24560 24228 21493 24228 21493 24228 21493 24228 21493
NOTE. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. A double asterisk indicates significance at the 5% level, and a single asterisk 
indicates significance at the 10% level. All regressions also include controls for semester and subject area. Data source: QSC.
18Table 7
Racial Determinants of Admission to UnB Using Siblings
Dependent Variable (First Difference Between Siblings)
Vestibular Score Lang Subscore SocSci Subscore Sci Subscore
Variable 
(First Difference)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Black racial identity -36.87 -36.39 -1.613 -1.863 -2.671 -3.024 -3.000 -2.447
(12.85) ** (15.57) ** (1.270) (1.357) (1.257) ** (1.432) ** (1.191) ** (1.460) *
Female gender -32.90 -32.87 -1.655 -1.672 -1.786 -1.810 -2.852 -2.815
(10.50) ** (10.49) ** (0.919) * (0.928) * (0.887) ** (0.886) ** (1.023) ** (1.022) **
Quota status -0.94 0.491 0.692 -1.084
(15.71) (1.548) (1.460) (1.494)
N 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483
NOTE. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. In the bottom panel, standard errors are adjusted for clustering on 
sibling group. A double asterisk indicates significance at the 5% level, and a single asterisk indicates significance at the 10% 
level. Sample is restricted to siblings who applied after the implementation of quotas. Data source: QSC.
19Table 8
Comparing Displaced and Displacing Applicants under Alternative Quota Policies
Quotas for Public School Quotas for Low Income
Displaced Displacing Displaced Displacing Difference in Means
Race/color
   White (branco) 47.1% 31.1% 39.5% 25.0% ** **
   Brown (pardo) 36.4 43.8 39.5 44.4 **
   Black (preto) 3.7 10.3 6.0 16.9 ** **
   Asian (amarelo) 2.7 3.4 3.1 5.3
   Indigenous 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4
   No answer 9.4 10.9 11.4 8.0 *
Black racial identity (negro) 23.6 38.4 29.8 48.6 ** **
Female gender 46.3 41.1 45.6 44.2 *
Family residence
   Brasilia 44.4 35.4 39.2 13.1 ** **
   Distrito Federal, not Brasilia 35.8 53.0 46.9 74.3 ** **
   Outside of Distrito Federal 19.8 11.6 13.9 12.6 **
Family income
   Less than R$ 500 1.6 7.2 0.0 100.0 ** **
   R$ 500-1,500 8.1 28.2 19.7 0.0 ** **
   R$ 1,500-2,500 14.3 21.2 19.1 0.0 ** **
   R$ 2,500-5,000 27.1 23.1 26.1 0.0 **
   More than R$ 5,000 36.6 13.0 23.9 0.0 ** **
   Don't know 12.3 7.4 11.2 0.0 ** **
Father's education
   Primary school incomplete 4.3 18.7 8.9 52.3 ** **
   Primary school complete 3.0 8.8 5.6 9.5 ** **
   Secondary school complete 27.8 32.8 29.7 21.4 * **
   College 63.3 36.1 52.0 9.0 ** **
   Don't know 1.6 3.7 3.7 7.8 ** **
Mother's education
   Primary school incomplete 2.1 17.1 7.1 45.0 ** **
   Primary school complete 1.4 9.7 5.0 16.6 ** **
   Secondary school complete 26.3 38.5 34.6 29.1 ** *
   College 69.1 34.0 51.0 8.3 ** **
   Don't know 1.1 0.6 2.3 1.0
Public secondary school 0.0 100.0 38.5 76.6 ** **
NOTE. This table considers an alternative policy reserving 50% of admissions slots for applicants who had attended public 
secondary school and an alternative policy reserving 20% of admissions slots for applicants who had family income equal to or 
less than R$ 500. A double asterisk indicates significant difference in proportions at the 5% level, and a single asterisk 
indicates significance at the 10% level. The first column of asterisks refers to quotas for public school, and the second column 
refers to quotas for low income. The displaced are those applicants who would have been admitted only if the alternative quota 
policy did not exist, while the displacing are those who would have been admitted only if the quota policy did exist. 628 
displaced and 628 displacing applicants were identified under quotas for public school, and the total sample size is about 1250 
due to missing socioeconomic data. 482 displaced and 482 displacing applicants were identified under quotas for low income, 
and the total sample size is about 954 due to missing socioeconomic data. Data source: QSC.
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